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Purpose:  The  objective  of this  study  was  to  develop  and  test  the reliability  and  validity  of  a  new  scale
designed  for  measuring  safety climate  among  mobile  remote  workers,  using  utility/electrical  workers  as
exemplar. The  new  scale  employs  perceived  safety  priority  as  the  metric  of  safety  climate  and  a multi-
level  framework,  separating  the  measurement  of  organization-  and  group-level  safety  climate  items  into
two sub-scales.  The  question  of the emergence  of  shared  perceptions  among  remote  workers  was  also
examined.
Method:  For  the initial  survey  development,  several  items  were  adopted  from  a generic  safety  climate
scale  and  new  industry-speciﬁc  items  were  generated  based  on an  extensive  literature  review,  expert
judgment,  15-day  ﬁeld  observations,  and  38 in-depth  individual  interviews  with  subject  matter  experts
(i.e.,  utility  industry  electrical  workers,  trainers  and supervisors  of electrical  workers).  The  items  were
revised  after  45 cognitive  interviews  and  a pre-test  with  139  additional  utility/electrical  workers.  The
revised  scale  was  subsequently  implemented  with  a total  of  2421 workers  at two  large  US  electric  utility
companies  (1560  participants  for  the  pilot  company  and  861  for  the  second  company).  Both  exploratory
(EFA)  and  conﬁrmatory  factor  analyses  (CFA)  were  adopted  to ﬁnalize  the  items  and  to  ensure  construct
validity.  Reliability  of the  scale  was  tested  based  on  Cronbach’s  ˛.  Homogeneity  tests  examined  whether
utility/electrical  workers’  safety  climate  perceptions  were  shared  within  the  same  supervisor  group.
This  was  followed  by an  analysis  of the criterion-related  validity,  which  linked  the  safety  climate  scores
to self-reports  of safety  behavior  and  injury  outcomes  (i.e., recordable  incidents,  missing  days  due  to
work-related  injuries,  vehicle  accidents,  and near  misses).
Results:  Six  dimensions  (Safety  pro-activity,  General  training,  Trucks  and  equipment,  Field orientation,
Financial  Investment,  and  Schedule  ﬂexibility)  with  29  items  were  extracted  from  the  EFA  to  measure  the
organization-level  safety  climate.  Three  dimensions  (Supervisory  care,  Participation  encouragement,  and
Safety  straight  talk)  with  19 items  were  extracted  to measure  the  group-level  safety  climate.  Acceptable
ranges  of  internal  consistency  statistics  for  the  sub-scales  were  observed.  Whether  or  not  to  aggregate
these  multi-dimensions  of safety  climate  into  a  single  higher-order  construct  (overall  safety  climate)  was
discussed.  CFAs  conﬁrmed  the  construct  validity  of the  developed  safety  climate  scale  for utility/electrical
workers.  Homogeneity  tests  showed  that  utility/electrical  workers’  safety  climate  perceptions  were
shared  within  the same  supervisor  group.  Both  the  organization-  and  group-level  safety  climate  scores
showed  a statistically  signiﬁcant  relationship  with  workers’  self-reported  safety  behaviors  and  injury
outcomes.
Implications:  A  valid  and  reliable  instrument  to  measure  the  essential  elements  of  safety  climate  for
utility/electrical  workers  in  th
in-depth understanding  of saf
can  be  made  at  both  group  and
future safety  interventions.
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. Introduction
.1. Safety climate
Safety climate is deﬁned as the shared perception among
orkers regarding their organization’s policies, procedures, and
ractices with respect to the relative value and importance of safety
Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000; Zohar, 1980, 2000, 2011, in press) and indi-
ates a temporal state that is measured at one discrete point in
ime (Cheyne et al., 1998). Formal policies are explicit (i.e., written
rocedures, overt statements), while enforced policies or enacted
ractices are implicit (i.e., observing the actions of management in
elation to key policy issues; Zohar, 2008). Enacted policies inform
mployees’ about likely organizational consequences they will face
f they sacriﬁce production for safety or vice versa (Zohar, 2008).
he enforced policies and procedures communicate to employees
he relative priorities (e.g., safety vs. speed or ﬂow of production) of
heir organization. In essence, an organization with a strong safety
limate communicates safety information formally through meet-
ngs and training and informally through on-the-job discussions
Christian et al., 2009). It is also important to note that manage-
ial commitment is at the core of safety climate, with an important
ole in the theoretical and empirical development of safety climate
Zohar, 2008). Overall, safety climate is one of the best leading
ndicators of organizational safety outcomes, such as frequency or
everity of injury incidents (Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009).
.2. The need for studying safety climate for remote workers
sing utility/electrical workers as exemplar
.2.1. Remote workers
Remote (or mobile) workers are deﬁned as individuals who
ork at a distance from a supervisor, thereby reducing in-person
upervision and increasing technology-mediated communication
Barsness et al., 2005; Kurland and Bailey, 1999). In general, there
s no one to observe their level of effort, productivity, safety, or time
pent on the job (Barsness et al., 2005). Much of the literature that
efers to remote workers describes teleworkers who work from
ome, satellite ofﬁces, neighborhood work centers, or while trav-
ling from one location to the next (Kurland and Bailey, 1999). This
tudy extends the remote worker literature to the utility indus-
ry, where workers travel to different locations throughout the day
o complete their work. A parallel investigation of long-haul truck
rivers in the lone worker situation has previously been published
Huang et al., 2013).
.2.2. High safety risk in the utility industry
The number of occupational injuries and illnesses requiring days
way from work was 5650 in private utility companies and 4770 in
he public utility companies in 2010, for a total of 10,420 workers
njured and ill (NIOSH, 2012). In 2010, there were 42 fatalities in
he utility industry as a whole (NIOSH, 2012), which is an increase
rom the 25 fatalities in 2009 (BLS, 2011a). Factors that contribute to
njury risk in the utility industry include potentially hazardous and
npredictable work environments, long shifts, working in emer-
ency situations, physically demanding maintenance and repair
asks, equipment use, customer interaction and, for certain employ-
es, extensive travel and driving (Kelsh et al., 2004).
The utility industry includes several types of services: electric
ower, natural gas, water supply, steam supply, and sewage
emoval (BLS, 2011b). Of the 559,500 waged jobs in the utilities
ndustry in 2008, electric power alone provided 404,700 of the
obs (72%; BLS, 2011c). The electric power industry is particularly
mportant to study because of the numerous challenges the elec-
rical utility companies face. These challenges include changing
orker demographics, deregulation, and increased competitionnd Prevention 59 (2013) 76– 86 77
(Kelsh et al., 2004). The average age of employees in the US electric
power industry is among the highest in the world (Ashworth,
2006). Recently, there has been downsizing in the industry as a
result of deregulation and fewer hires made because of work prac-
tice redesign and technology implementation (Gross et al., 2002;
Niederjohn, 2003). While energy generation has steadily increased
by 30% from 1970 to 2004, employment has decreased by 23.7%
(Ashworth, 2006). Greater advances in technology change the types
of skills utility workers need (Borland, 2002; Chowdhury, 2000;
Gross et al., 2002). The rapid advances in technology also affect
safety, making it necessary to continuously monitor, reevaluate,
and analyze worker injury risk (Kelsh et al., 2004). In fact, Cawley
and Homce (2006) examined trends in electrical injury between
1992 and 2002 and concluded that a majority of fatalities were
the result of contact with overhead power lines (47%) and contact
with wiring, transformers, or other electrical components (33%).
1.2.3. Safety climate for remote workers in the utility/electric
power industry
Different types of industries are likely to have unique dimen-
sions of safety climate and herein arises the need for measurement
of industry-speciﬁc safety climate (Zohar, 2010). Identifying
industry-speciﬁc safety climate scales has been suggested in
previous research (Zohar, 2010) as a way  to recognize new, context-
dependent targets of climate perceptions within a given industry.
Developing new climate indicators in each industry has the poten-
tial to aid researchers in postulating and testing hypotheses which
aim to study how climates emerge. Traditional studies of the util-
ity industry have focused on equipment and worker behavior (e.g.,
Kromhout et al., 1995; Savitz et al., 1997). This study extends the
traditional research to include the safety climate impact on safety
outcomes for utility/electrical workers who  constitute a unique
group (remote workers), as they work away from their home base.
The objective of this study was  to develop and test the reliability and
validity of a new scale designed for measuring safety climate among
remote workers, using utility/electrical workers as exemplar.
1.3. The conceptual framework of the safety climate measure
The construction of a new safety climate measure speciﬁcally
for the utility/electric power industry was based on three propo-
sitions put forth by Zohar (2008, 2010) following three decades of
safety climate research. First, employees should be asked about the
safety priority of their organization when examining their safety
climate perceptions. Second, follow a multi-level framework in
which employees are asked about the safety priorities of their
company and their direct supervisors separately. Third, examine
whether safety perceptions are shared (Christian et al., 2009; Zohar,
2010). In this study, it was of particular importance to test whether
shared perceptions can emerge among remote workers given that
they are removed from frequent face-to-face contact with their
supervisors and most of their co-workers.
1.3.1. Perceived priorities and multi-level framework for safety
climate
In addition to safety, organizations have a number of issues that
must be addressed, such as speed or ﬂow of production (Zohar,
2008). Since those operational issues often compete with safety,
organizations enforce policies and procedures according to their
priorities of safety and other production goals. Therefore, items
should present situations concerning competing demands (e.g.,
safety vs. speed, schedules, ﬂow, proﬁtability). Presenting such sit-
uations allows employees to clearly identify their organization’s
priorities, as they perceive them. The new safety climate scale
examines employees’ perceptions using safety priority as the met-
ric of safety climate.
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Researchers should also evaluate employees’ safety climate per-
eptions at both the organization-level and group-level. Zohar
nd his colleague (Zohar, 2008; Zohar and Luria, 2005) proposed
 multi-level framework for safety climate in which there is a
istinction between the organization- and group-level because
mployees may  have different perceptions when the referent (i.e.,
op management or direct supervisors) changes. The priorities of
op management (organization-level) are not always the same as
he priorities of unit-level supervisors (group-level), although they
re likely to be related. More speciﬁcally, the organization-level
afety climate involves procedures established by the company and
op management actions in the promotion of safety. Group-level
afety climate concerns direct supervisory and workgroup safety
ractices. For that reason, the current study utilized a newly devel-
ped scale that separates the measurement of organization- and
roup-level safety climate using a different sub-scale for each.
.3.2. Potential shared safety climate perceptions
Christian et al. (2009) categorized safety climate into two  lev-
ls, shared group-level and individual-psychological safety climate.
1) They summarized the literature (e.g., James et al., 1978; James
nd Sells, 1981; Jermier et al., 1989; Young, 2010) and deﬁned
ndividual-level/psychological safety climate as perceptions about
afety-related policies, practices, and procedures pertaining to
afety matters that affect a person’s well-being at work. 2) A
roup-level safety climate emerges when these individual-level
erceptions are shared and consensus is made among individuals
ithin a particular work environment (e.g., James et al., 1990;
oung, 2010) as related to safety matters that may affect a group
f individuals (e.g., Grifﬁn and Neal, 2000; Zohar and Luria, 2005;
oung, 2010). Remote workers are physically removed from their
rganization a large part of the time and often do not interact with
heir supervisors or a majority of their co-workers. Thus, this study
ested the homogeneity of safety climate perceptions in order to
etermine the type of analysis (i.e., individual or group/work unit)
pplicable to this sample in the utility industry.
. Study design/methodology
Both qualitative and quantitative methods were employed to
esign the safety climate scale for the electric utility industry.
arget participants were utility/electrical ﬁeld workers. Informed
onsent was prepared for each stage of the process, using spe-
iﬁc consent forms for the individual interviews, ﬁeld observations,
ognitive interviews, pilot tests, and actual survey data collec-
ion stages. Study procedures at each stage were approved by the
ppropriate Institutional Review Board. The survey development
rocedures are summarized in Fig. 1.
.1. Initial survey question development
Initial survey questions were designed by the project team after:
a) Review of scientiﬁc literature that led to the adoption of generic
afety climate scale items (6 each for organization- and group-level
afety climate) from Zohar and Luria (2005); (b) Review of accident
nquiries, which included utility/electric companies’ safety perfor-
ance metrics, such as injury rate, recordable incidents, missing
ays due to work-related injuries, vehicle accidents, near misses,
nd safety audit scores; and (c) Input from subject matter experts,
ncluding utility electrical workers, safety personnel, supervisors
nd trainers of electric company drivers, and insurance experts
n the utility industry. Furthermore, thirty-eight individual in-
epth interviews were conducted with electrical workers and their
upervisors at one large utility company, plus 15 days of ﬁeld obser-
ations. These steps helped the research team to become familiar
ith the working context of utility workers.and Prevention 59 (2013) 76– 86
The research team utilized the conceptual ideas regarding
attributes of climate perceptions, a multi-level (organization- and
group-level) perspective outlined by Zohar and Luria (2005), when
conducting these 38 in-depth interviews. Workers were asked to
describe a variety of issues characterizing their work and issues
indicative of the priority of safety of their companies. Discussions
in all interviews centered around job functions, communication
patterns, work priorities/daily challenges, supervisory interactions,
safety concerns and the kinds of behaviors likely to be supported
and rewarded by the company. Four members of the research team,
experienced in conducting interview discussions, took turns in
facilitating these interviews. Each interview lasted approximately
1 h. The interviews continued up to the point of reaching data
saturation where no new information emerged with additional
interviews. The procedures were approved by the appropriate Insti-
tutional Review Boards.
The subsequent analysis was  based on notes taken during the
interview sessions. The individual notes of all 38 interviews were
aggregated into one set of notes and typed into a transcript doc-
ument. The same four team members worked together in reading
the transcript and noting speciﬁc parts that stood out as signiﬁcant
or meaningful statements, which served as the basis for generat-
ing initial survey items. Combining the information from all of the
above, a draft of potential safety climate items was  compiled. In
total, 94 items (62 items for the organization-level and 32 items for
the supervisor/group-level safety climate sub-scales) were devel-
oped which included both the generic items and industry-speciﬁc
items for mobile remote workers.
2.2. Pre-testing process
2.2.1. Cognitive/think-aloud interviews
Cognitive/think-aloud interviews with 45 utility/electrical
workers were conducted to examine the meanings of the items
(for clariﬁcation purposes), identify language and/or content issues
while completing the questionnaire (e.g., long pauses, inconsis-
tent answers, indications of confusion), and the extent to which
these items cover all relevant safety practices. This procedure was
used to improve content validity and face validity. Participants
were recruited from the pilot electric utility company where inter-
views for initial item generation were held. Revisions were made
for things such as item wording, presentation order in the survey,
and format of the survey based on participants’ comments and sug-
gestions. The revised scale after cognitive interviews included 34
items measuring organization-level and 22 items measuring group-
level safety climate. The revised scale was  used for the next pre-test
step.
2.2.2. Pre-test
After the cognitive interviews, the pre-test was  conducted
with 139 additional electrical workers from the same pilot util-
ity company. These pre-tests were conducted to make sure the
questions were clear and the survey administration was feasible
(e.g., estimating the survey completion time). A 5-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) was  used for all safety
climate items. After this stage, the survey was revised.
2.3. Survey implementation at the pilot electric utility company
The revised version of the survey (i.e., 34 items to measure
organization-level and 22 items to measure group-level safety
climate) was implemented at the pilot company. With ofﬁcial per-
mission from the company, the procedure was  as follows: all ﬁeld
workers were invited to participate in this survey on a voluntary
basis. There were a total of 70 platforms (locations/ofﬁces) at the
pilot company. Two  persons at each platform administered the
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Safety Climate  Su rvey Develo pment Process
* Workers, sup erviso rs, and safety profess ion als
1. Information gathe ring
2. Sur vey it ems develop ment
3. Testing
4. Ana lysis
5. Implemen tation
6. Furthe r analyses
a. Review sc ien tific literature
b. Review ac cide nt inqu iries
c. Input fr om subject matter expe rts*
d. 38 in-depth interviews with electrical workers and their 
supervisors
e. 15-da y field observation
a. Generate items for survey questions
(An  initial 94  it ems we re gen erated- 62 it ems  for the 
organization-level and 32 items for the supervisor / group-level 
safety climate  sub-scales)
a. Condu ct 45 co gnitive  interviews wi th  electrical workers to 
ensure  compreh ens ion
b. Revise questions b ased on  the  feedba ck
(The revised sub-scales included 34 items to measure 
organization-level and 22 items to measure supervisor/group-
level safety climate)
c. Administer “pre-test”  survey with  139 electrical workers
d. Administer survey at the pil ot electric co mpany (n =  1560)
a. Ana lyze preli mina ry data fr om pilot test 
(i.e . exploratory  & confirmatory factor ana lyses,  reliabilit y test)
b. Fi nalize  survey based on  the data
(Fin al survey inc luded 29 it ems  for organ ization -level and 19 
items  for supervisor / group-level safety climate  sub-scales
a. Administer final survey to  the  second electric co mpany to c ross 
validate the results  (n = 861 )
a. Reliabilit y and validity testing
b. Examine shared  safety climate p ercepti on a mon g work group
y item
s
p
a
u
n
w
s
w
t
s
w
t
t
b
s
s
q
2
v
p
S
rFigure 1. Surve
urvey – one management person and one union steward. They
resented the study, showing that both the company and union
pproved the participation. Then the manager exited the room. The
nion steward ensured that the workers understood the voluntary
ature of the survey, and the conﬁdentiality as well; the workers
ere then given the informed consent forms. Workers placed their
urveys in a sealed container once they ﬁnished ﬁlling them out. All
orkers were invited to return their survey (even if they decided
o leave it blank). No individual identiﬁer was  collected for this
tudy. The location/platform for which each employee reported
as recorded on each survey. The average time of completion of
he survey was about 20 min. No incentives were provided for par-
icipation by request of the pilot company. Surveys were completed
y 2234 electrical workers with a response rate of 46%. Individual
urveys with more than 50% missing values in the safety climate
cale items were excluded from the analysis; accordingly, 1560
uestionnaires were used for further analysis.
.4. Survey implementation at one additional company
One additional utility company was recruited in order to cross-
alidate the results of the study. Similar procedures used at the
ilot company were implemented in the second electric company.
urveys were completed by 869 electrical workers for a response
ate of 74%. After excluding surveys with extensive missing values development.
(more than 50% missing values on the safety climate scale), 861
questionnaires for the second company were used for further anal-
ysis.
2.5. Final survey items based on reliability and validity analyses
Both exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and conﬁrmatory factor
analysis (CFA) were performed to provide information for the fac-
torial validity. The EFA with a varimax rotation was performed with
the data collected from the pilot company (n = 1560) to explore
the factorial structure of the newly developed safety climate scale.
We chose varimax rotation because we assumed that these factors
would stand independently. The EFA addresses research questions
that include: (a) How many factors exist in organization- and
group-level safety climate sub-scales? (b) Do items that belong to a
speciﬁc factor converge well without cross-loading onto other fac-
tors? and (c) Which features are most important in the classiﬁcation
of a group of items? (DeCoster, 1998). Items were selected based
on the factor structure, factor loading, and content validity. Items
with multiple loading and relatively weak factor loading (less than
.40) were dropped out. At the same time, theoretical and practical
aspects of the items were also considered. For instance, the item
“My  company addresses truck problems that we see as a safety
issue in a timely manner” from the organizational-level safety cli-
mate scale was  loaded on both the Safety pro-activity factor with
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 = .44 and the Trucks and equipment factor with  = .46. However,
s the content of this item is apparently related to truck issues,
he item was retained in the Trucks and equipment factor. Based on
he ﬁndings from the EFA, the initial piloted item set was  trimmed
own and reﬁned to form both organization- and group-level safety
limate ﬁnal sub-scales.
Internal consistency among items associated with each of the
btained factors was assessed based on Cronbach’s  ˛ statistics.
tems that decreased sub-scale reliability were dropped. After the
FA and reliability test on internal consistency, 29 items to measure
rganization-level and 19 items to measure supervisor/group-level
afety climate were chosen as the ﬁnal sub-scale items.
The CFA came after to conﬁrm the construct validity of the
afety climate scale. A series of CFAs were performed ﬁrst with
he data collected from the pilot company and then with the data
rom the second company to assure factor structure validity of
he safety climate scale. The quality of the model ﬁt was  exam-
ned based on comparative ﬁt index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index
TLI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). For
FI and TLI, .95 or greater is interpreted as evidence of appro-
riate ﬁt (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The guidelines for interpreting
MSEA are as follows: RMSEA < .05 indicates a good model ﬁt;
05 < RMSEA < .08 indicates a reasonable model ﬁt, and RMSEA > .10
ndicates a poor model ﬁt (Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Hair et al.,
998).
.6. Examining shared safety climate perception
Within-group agreement and reliability indices such as rwgj and
ntra-class Correlation Coefﬁcients ICC(1) and ICC(2) (Bartko, 1976;
ames et al., 1984, 1993; Bliese, 2000) were calculated to examine
mployees’ shared perceptions in the same work unit (same super-
isor group). The criteria for individual data aggregation to create
roup variables were as follows:
1) ICC(1):  indicates the extent to which individuals within the
same organization assign the same psychological meaning to,
or agree in their perceptions of, an organizational characteristic
(Ostroff and Schmitt, 1993). There are no deﬁnitive guidelines
on acceptable ICC(1) values. In past research, ICC(1) values have
ranged from 0 to .50, with a median of .12 (James, 1982; Ostroff
and Schmitt, 1993). One of the most widely accepted criterion
for ICC(1) is over .10, which indicates ICC(1) with medium effect
size (Murphy and Myors, 1998).
2) ICC(2):  assesses the relative status of between and within vari-
ability using the average ratings of respondents within each
unit (Bartko, 1976). It indicates reliability at the aggregate level,
or the reliability of means (Ostroff and Schmitt, 1993). There is
no strict standard of acceptability of ICC(2) values. One of the
most widely accepted criterion for ICC(2) is over .70 (LeBreton
and Senter, 2008; Ostroff and Schmitt, 1993).
3) rwgj: is an assessment of within-group inter-rater agreement
(James et al., 1993). A median of rwgj larger than .70 was  used
as the criterion.
.7. Measure of safety criteria and data analysis
Self-reported safety behavior: To assess self-reported safety
ehavior of the participating utility workers, 11 items adapted from
uang et al. (2005) were used in the survey. Example items include:
Before starting a job, I take an overview of the whole situation,”
I always report back to my  supervisor with any safety concerns,”
nd “I never throw or toss hand tools to a co-worker on a ladder
r in a raised bucket.” The items were all on a 5-point Likert scale
1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree); Cronbach’s  ˛ for these
1 items was .65 with data from the pilot company, and .60 for theand Prevention 59 (2013) 76– 86
second company. A similar level of internal consistency (  ˛ = .65)
was observed for a previous study with a trucking company sample
(n = 7466; Huang et al., 2013). The average score of these 11 items
was used as the indicator of this construct. Ordinary least square
regression and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) analyses were
conducted to examine the relationship between safety climate and
safety behavior.
Safety outcomes: For the second company, four additional ques-
tions regarding safety outcomes were included. Within the past
12 months: (1) While on the job, have you been involved in any
near misses?; (2) While on the job, have you been involved in any
recordable incidents?; (3) While on the job, have you been involved
in any vehicle accidents?; and (4) While on the job, have you missed
any days due to any work-related injuries? A binary (Yes-No) scale
was used for all four items. To investigate the relationships between
safety climate and the safety outcomes, logistic regression and HLM
based on Bernoulli estimation were used.
3. Results
3.1. Construct validity and reliability of the scale
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted ﬁrst with the
pilot utility company data (n = 1560). Factor loadings, eigenvalues
for the factors, and percentage of explained variance by the fac-
tors are presented in Tables 1A and 1B. A six-factor solution for
the organization-level safety climate sub-scale (Safety proactivity,
General training, Trucks and equipment,  Field orientation,  Financial
investment, and Schedule ﬂexibility, total 29 items) and a three-
factor solution for group-level safety climate sub-scale (Supervisory
care, Participation encouragement,  and Safety straight talk, total 19
items) were obtained. Internal consistency statistics (Crobach’s
˛) of the organization- and group-level safety climate sub-scales
were, respectively, .90 and .92 for the pilot company (n = 1560)
and .91 and .93 for the second company (n = 861). The values
indicate good scale reliability. Means, standard deviations, inter-
nal consistency statistics, and scale sub-factor inter-correlations
for the pilot company and the second company are presented in
Table 2.
The conﬁrmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were conducted ﬁrst
for the pilot company, then the second utility company for cross-
validation purposes. The ﬁnalized items’ factorial validity (for three
different factor models) was  conﬁrmed by the CFAs all across:
(1) the multiple-factor, (2) overall one-factor, and (3) 2nd order
hierarchical factor models (Table 3). The multiple-factor models
were based on the six or three sub-factors of the organization-
and group-level safety climate sub-scales, respectively, while the
overall one-factor model assumed all the items were indicators
of a single latent variable representing overall safety climate. The
2nd order hierarchical factor models included sub-factors of the
safety climate scale and a single upper-level overall factor which
had the sub-factors as indicators. CFIs and TLIs were all greater
than .95 while RMSEAs were smaller than .10, which indicated
goodness of model ﬁt across the different factor models. Also,
statistically signiﬁcant and considerable correlations between the
multiple factors were observed (ranging from .24 to .82, p < .01).
Given that the one-factor models for both organization- and group-
level safety climate sub-scales had relatively weak model ﬁt in
terms of chi-square and RMSEA statistics, the 2nd order hierar-
chical factor model was  the most suitable construct model thatthe CFAs showed that safety climate can be best understood with
consideration of the scale’s sub-factors that were closely related to
one another and constitute an upper-level overall factor of safety
climate.
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Table 1A
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) results for organization-level safety climate (OSC) scale.
My company (Top management) Factor
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6
F1: Safety pro-activity (7 items)
X1: Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety concernsa .67 .11 – .36 .15 –
X2:  Is strict about working safely when work falls behind schedulea .67 .18 .12 – .18 .15
X3:  Reacts quickly to my concerns regarding safety .66 .14 .22 .29 – .12
X4:  Tries to continually improve safety levels in each departmenta .66 .29 .23 – .11 –
X5:  Listens carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safetya .64 – .12 .36 – .12
X6:  Uses any available information to improve existing safety rulesa .60 .24 .25 .21 – –
X7:  Invests a lot in safety training for workersa .53 .40 .29 – .13 –
F2:  General training (4 items)
X8: Offers a variety of training that is relevant to our work and equipment .20 .74 .13 – .13 –
X9:  Ensures new workers have performed high risk tasks before moving them to the next level .16 .62 .18 .23 – –
X10:  Ensures that the trainers have relevant experience in our areas of work .22 .58 .23 .15 .12 –
X11:  Understands that we often face unexpected circumstances on the job .27 .43 – .37 – –
F3:  Trucks and equipment (5 items)
X12: Provides trucks that allow for easy access to equipment .20 .21 .61 .15 – –
X13:  Provides trucks with the best safety equipment (back-up cameras, mirrors, bubble lights) .16 .30 .58 – .13 –
X14:  Invests in the best safety equipment available (e.g., power tools, meter pullers, lighting) .37 – .58 .13 .13 –
X15:  Holds sub-contractors to the same standards as employees – .14 .53 .22 – –
X16:  Addresses truck problems that we see as a safety issue in a timely manner .44 – .46 .28 – –
F4:  Field orientation (5 items)
X17: Uses dispatchers or schedulers who have experience in the ﬁeld .21 – .24 .58 – –
X18:  Ensures that daily work orders are clear and correct .28 .17 – .53 – –
X19:  Ensures that centralized operations staff know the geographical areas .23 .13 .36 .52 – –
X20:  Helps us deal with unexpected situations by offering training on decision-making skills .21 .41 – .46 – –
X21:  Provides training to prepare us for unusual situations (e.g., storms, emergencies) .16 .39 .18 .41 – –
F5:  Financial investment (5 items)
X22: Expects us to follow new electrical operating procedures without enough training .17 .25 – – .71 –
X23:  Offers us little training for new or different electrical equipment – .26 – −.13 .61 –
X24:  Is slow to remove outdated electrical equipment (e.g., wires, cables, switches, meters) .13 – .16 .18 .60 .12
X25:  Keeps using older equipment, even when it means greater safety risks .13 −.15 .36 – .57 –
X26:  Sometimes cuts corners on safety when a large number of customers are without power .44 .11 – – .46 .20
F6:  Schedule ﬂexibility (3 items)
X27: Pressures the supervisors to get more productivity from their workers – – – .10 .17 .77
X28:  Promotes safety but pressures us to complete our work assignments on time .12 – – −.13 – .76
X29:  Has supervisors unnecessarily monitoring our locations to make sure we’re on task – – – .24 – .64
Eigenvalues 8.94 2.12 1.58 1.34 1.22 1.08
Percentage variance 26.30 6.23 4.65 3.95 3.60 3.17
Cumulative variance 26.30 32.53 37.17 41.12 44.72 47.89
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.2. Aggregation of safety climate measures
Shared perception of safety climate among the utility/electrical
orkers was examined by agreement (rwgj) and reliability (ICC(1)
nd (2)) statistics (rwgj > .70 (James et al., 1993), ICC(1) > .10
Murphy and Myors, 1998), and ICC(2) > .70 (LeBreton and Senter,
008) were used as criteria). For the pilot company, 115 work-
nits were identiﬁed with the average number of utility workers
n a work-unit as 12.4. The median rwgj values were .95 and .93 for
he organization- and group-level safety climate sub-scales, respec-
ively. Consensus among within-work-unit respondents was good.
or the two safety climate sub-scales (i.e., organization- and group-
evel), ANOVA showed signiﬁcant between-work-unit differences
ith F(114, 1313) = 3.70 (p < .01) and 3.33 (p < .01), respectively. The
CC(1)/ICC(2) statistics were .21/.73 and .19/.70, respectively, for
he organization- and group-level safety climate sub-scales. The
ggregated work-unit mean scores showed good reliability. Shared
afety climate perception was supported among work groups.
For the second company, there were 68 work-units with an aver-
ge of 9.1 utility workers in a work-unit. The values of median rwgj,
CC(1), and ICC(2) for the organization-level safety climate were
96, .25, and .75 (F(67, 553) = 3.96, p < .01). The values of median
wgj, ICC(1), and ICC(2) for the group-level safety climate were .93, indicate factor loading >.40 that are appropriate for a particular factor.
a (2005) and Huang et al. (2013).
.27, and .77 (F(67, 553) = 4.30, p < .01). Table 4 presents the results
of within-group agreement and reliability testing. These ﬁndings
altogether supported the presence of shared safety climate and
aggregation of the safety climate measures to form work-unit-level
safety climate entities beyond an individual (or psychological) level
of safety climate perception.
3.3. Criterion-related validity
Criterion-related validity of the utility industry-speciﬁc safety
climate scale was  investigated with both individual and cross-level
perspectives as the multi-level feature of safety climate was  sup-
ported.
3.3.1. Overall safety climate scores and safety behavior
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression analyses were per-
formed to investigate the individual-level variables’ relationships.
The utility electrical workers’ self-reports of safety behavior were
regressed on the organization- and group-level safety climate
scores. Slope statistics B values were .26 (S.E. = .02, 95% CI = .22,
.31) and .30 (S.E. = .02, 95% CI = .27, .34), respectively, for the
organization- and group-level safety climate sub-scales in the pilot
company. B values in the second company were .18 (S.E. = .03, 95%
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Table  1B
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) results for group-level safety climate (GSC) scale.
My  direct supervisor Factor
F1 F2 F3
F1: Supervisory care (12 items)
Y1: Takes the time to check on me,  especially when I’m stressed or tired .77 – –
Y2:  Checks in with me  when I am in unsafe neighborhoods .74 – –
Y3:  Gives me positive feedback when I perform safely .74 .28 .15
Y4:  Discusses ways to improve performance after non-routine or unusual job tasks .72 .33 .12
Y5:  Gives me feedback about the quality of my work .70 .21 .12
Y6:  Effectively communicates my  concerns to the company .69 .16 .19
Y7:  Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safelya .65 .37 .21
Y8:  Takes the time to listen to my concerns regarding safety .64 .39 .23
Y9:  Compliments workers who pay special attention to safetya .64 .29 .13
Y10:  Frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work weeka .55 .49 .17
Y11:  Lets me  rearrange my work schedule so it makes sense to me  .52 – .28
Y12:  Trusts our expertise and lets us use that knowledge in the ﬁeld .45 .33 .39
F2:  Participation encouragement (4 items)
Y13: Makes sure I use all the safety equipment for the job (PPE, rubber on lines) .22 .78 –
Y14:  Expects us to discuss the job in depth during the tailboard (pre-job brief) – .78 –
Y15:  Discusses with us how to improve safetya .41 .56 .16
Y16:  Encourages a discussion among us after any major incident .37 .52 .16
F3:  Safety straight talk (3 items)
Y17: Talks about safety but pressures us to complete work on time .13 – .78
Y18:  Expects me  to answer the phone or radio when he/she calls, even while I’m driving – .20 .73
Y19:  Assigns too much work for some employees, resulting in uneven work loads .24 – .66
Eigenvalues 8.77 1.49 1.39
Percentage variance 39.87 6.78 6.34
Cumulative variance 39.87 46.65 52.98
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ork  falls behind schedule” and “Is strict about working safely even when we are t
I = .13, .24) and .19 (S.E. = .02, 95% CI = .15, .23), respectively, for the
wo safety climate sub-scales. All the B statistics were statistically
igniﬁcant at the p < .01 level, showing that the individual-level
afety climate scores were signiﬁcant predictors of electrical work-
rs’ safety behavior (Table 5A).
An HLM approach was adopted to examine the relationship
etween aggregated work-unit shared safety climate scores and
ndividual safety behavior of the utility workers. The HLM equation
sed is shown below:
Safety behavior)ij = 00 + 01 × (Safety climate)j + rijSafety climate represents either organization- or group-level
afety climate while i and j denote individual and work unit,
espectively. Slope statistic 01 is the counterpart of B in OLS regres-
ion. The 01 values were .10 (S.E. = .05, 95% CI = −.02, .26, p < .10)
able 2
escriptive statistics and internal consistency of the organization-level safety climate (OSC
below  diagonal: pilot company data (n = 1560); above diagonal: 2nd company (n = 861)).
Pilot company 2nd company 1 2 
Mean (S.D.)  ˛ Mean (S.D.) ˛
1. OSC factor1 3.14 (.77) .86 3.17 (.77) .87 – .62 
2.  OSC factor 2 3.41 (.81) .69 3.35 (.79) .67 .60 – 
3.  OSC factor3 2.76 (.81) .72 2.80 (.74) .69 .64 .51 
4.  OSC factor4 2.69 (.73) .69 2.76 (.73) .70 .61 .53 
5.  OSC factor5 2.70 (.78) .69 2.73 (.74) .69 .48 .36 
6.  OSC factor6 2.33 (.78) .63 2.15 (.80) .58 .26 .17 
7.  Total OSC 2.88 (.58) .90 2.88 (.58) .91 .88 .74 
8.  GSC factor1 3.22 (.79) .92 3.12 (.84) .92 .55 .39 
9.  GSC factor2 4.04 (.65) .76 3.78 (.78) .78 .49 .36 
10.  GSC factor3 2.94 (.85) .64 2.83 (.88) .60 .30 .21 
11.  Total GSC 3.35 (.67) .92 3.21 (.74) .93 .57 .41 
ote. OSC: organization-level safety climate – OSC factor 1, Safety pro-activity; OSC fac
rientation; OSC factor 5, Financial investment; OSC factor 6, Schedule ﬂexibility. GSC, gro
ncouragement; GSC factor 3, Safety straight talk. All the correlation coefﬁcients were sta indicate factor loading >.40 that are appropriate for a particular factor.
 (2005) and Huang et al. (2013). Generic items “Refuses to ignore safety rules when
 stressed” dropped after exploratory factor analysis.
and .19 (S.E. = .05, 95% CI = .09, .33, p < .01), respectively, for the
organization- and group-level safety climate sub-scales in the pilot
company. In the second company, the 01 values were .14 (S.E. = .06,
95% CI = .02, .26, p < .05) and .21 (S.E. = .04, 95% CI = .13, .29, p < .01),
respectively, for the two  safety climate sub-scales. The results are
summarized in Table 5B. These ﬁndings supported the positive
and signiﬁcant relationship between work-unit safety climate and
individual-safety behavior of the utility workers.
3.3.2. Overall safety climate scores and safety outcomes
In addition to safety behavior, self-reported safety outcomes(i.e., near misses, recordable incidents, vehicle accidents, and
missed work days due to injury) were obtained from the second
utility company (n = 861). To examine the relationships between
individual safety climate and safety outcomes, logistic regressions
) scale and group-level safety climate (GSC) scale along with factor inter-correlations
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
.61 .65 .51 .32 .88 .60 .50 .34 .61
.49 .57 .43 .25 .75 .48 .40 .28 .48
– .53 .48 .26 .77 .43 .34 .21 .42
.56 – .42 .28 .79 .47 .31 .20 .44
.40 .30 – .37 .72 .33 .23 .23 .33
.17 .17 .32 – .49 .32 .14 .44 .34
.79 .75 .67 .41 – .60 .45 .37 .60
.44 .44 .32 .20 .56 – .72 .52 .98
.34 .31 .26 .04ns .44 .67 – .37 .81
.19 .20 .38 .45 .38 .45 .31 – .64
.43 .43 .37 .25 .58 .97 .76 .60 –
tor 2, General training; OSC factor 3, Trucks and equipment; OSC  factor 4, Field
up-level safety climate – GSC factor 1, Supervisory care; GSC factor 2, Participation
tistically signiﬁcant at p < .01 except a value marked with ns.
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Table 3
Conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) results: (A) organization-level safety climate and (B) group-level safety climate.
CFA models Fit indexes
X2 (df) CFI TLI RMSEA (90% CI)
(A) Organization-level safety climatea
Pilot company (n = 1560)
Model 1: six-factor 1909.29 (362) .99 .98 .052 (.050, .055)
Model  2: one-factor 3603.81 (377) .97 .97 .074 (.072, .076)
Model  3: 2nd order hierarchical 2043.92 (371) .99 .98 .054 (.052, .056)
2nd  company (n = 861)
Model 1: Six-Factor 1163.46 (362) .99 .98 .051 (.047, .054)
Model  2: One-Factor 1909.54 (377) .97 .97 .069 (.066, .072)
Model  3: 2nd order hierarchical 1196.07 (371) .99 .98 .051 (.048, .054)
(B)  Group-level safety climateb
Pilot company (n = 1560)
Model 1: three-factor 1249.85 (149) .99 .98 .069 (.065, .072)
Model  2: one-factor 1854.85 (152) .98 .97 .085 (.081, .088)
Model  3: 2nd order hierarchical 1249.85 (149) .99 .98 .069 (.065, .072)
2nd  company (n = 861)
Model 1: three-factor 1168.32 (167) .98 .97 .083 (.079, .088)
Model  2: one-factor 1405.07 (170) .97 .97 .092 (.087, .096)
Model  3: 2nd order hierarchical 1168.32 (167) .98 .97 .083 (.079, .088)
a Model 1: a structural model with six sub-factors (1. Safety pro-activity; 2. General training; 3. Trucks and equipment; 4. Field orientation; 5. Financial investment; 6.
Schedule ﬂexibility). Model 2: a structural model with one overall factor for total 29 items. Model 3: a structural model with one overall 2nd order factor of safety climate
with  six sub-factors (1. Safety pro-activity; 2. General training; 3. Trucks and equipment; 4. Field orientation; 5. Financial investment; 6. Schedule ﬂexibility).
b Model 1: a structural model with three sub-factors (1. Supervisory care; 2. Participation encouragement; 3. Safety straight talk). Model 2: a structural model with one
overall  factor for total 19 items. Model 3: a structural model with one overall 2nd order factor of safety climate with three sub-factors (1. Supervisory care; 2. Participation
encouragement; 3. Safety straight talk).
Table 4
Testing of shared safety climate perception.
Pilot company (n = 1560) 2nd company (n = 861)
rwgj ICC(1) ICC(2) F rwgj ICC(1) ICC(2) F
OSC factor1 .87 (.23–.96) .17 .67 2.99 .88 (.49–1.00) .21 .71 3.49
OSC  factor 2 .71 (.00–.98) .17 .67 3.06 .75 (.00–.97) .17 .65 2.82
OSC  factor3 .73 (.00–1.00) .20 .72 3.52 .78 (.09–.96) .11 .54 2.17
OSC  factor4 .82 (.00–.98) .18 .68 3.17 .83 (.24–.98) .25 .75 4.02
OSC  factor5 .71 (.00–.98) .13 .60 2.50 .81 (.21–1.00) .16 .64 2.75
OSC  factor6 .74 (.00–.94) .11 .54 2.18 .72 (.00–1.00) .10 .51 2.05
Total  OSC .95 (.66–.99) .21 .73 3.70 .96 (.69–.99) .25 .75 3.96
GSC  factor1 .91 (.00–1.00) .19 .70 3.32 .89 (.36–1.00) .26 .75 4.24
GSC  factor2 .86 (.15–.99) .09 .51 2.06 .84 (.00–.98) .17 .66 2.91
GSC  factor3 .66 (.00–.95) .13 .60 2.52 .66 (.00–.96) .18 .67 3.02
Total  GSC .93 (.00–.99) .19 .70 3.33 .93 (.00–1.00) .27 .77 4.30
Note. OSC, organization-level safety climate – OSC factor 1, Safety pro-activity; OSC factor 2, General training; OSC factor 3, Trucks and equipment; OSC  factor 4, Field
orientation; OSC factor 5, Financial investment; OSC factor 6, Schedule ﬂexibility. GSC, group-level safety climate – GSC factor 1, Supervisory care; GSC factor 2, Participation
encouragement; GSC factor 3, Safety straight talk. All the F values were statistically signiﬁcant at p < .01 level. rwgj > .70 (James et al., 1993), ICC(1) > .10 (Murphy and Myors,
1998), and ICC(2) > .70 (LeBreton and Senter, 2008) were used as criteria. rwgj statistics are mean values with ranges within bracket.
Table  5
Safety climate and safety behavior relationship. (A) Ordinary least square regression with individual-level safety climate (level 1) as predictor of self-report safety behavior
(level  1) and (B) Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) with work-unit-level safety climate (level 2) as predictor of self-report safety behavior (level 1).
Pilot company (n = 1560) 2nd company (n = 861)
R2 Intercept (S.E.) B (S.E.) 95% CI R2 Intercept (S.E.) B (S.E.) 95% CI
(A)
OSC .09** 2.95 (.06)** .26 (.02)** .22, .31 .05** 3.10 (.08)** .18 (.03)** .13, .24
GSC  .15** 2.70 (.06)** .30 (.02)** .27, .34 .09** 3.02 (.07)** .19 (.02)** .15, .23
Pilot company (n = 1560) 2nd company (n = 861)
00 (S.E.) 01 (S.E.) 01 95% CI 00 (S.E.) 01 (S.E.) 01 95% CI
(B)
Bsftyij = 00 + 01 × OSCj + rij 3.69 (.01)** .10 (.05)† −.02, .26 3.62 (.02)** .14 (.06)* .02, .26
Bsftyij = 00 + 01 × GSCj + rij 3.69 (.01)** .19 (.05)** .09, .33 3.62 (.02)** .21 (.04)** .13, .29
Note. OSC, organization-level safety climate (29 items); GSC, group-level safety climate (19 items); Bsfty, Safety behavior.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
† p < .10.
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Table  6
Relationships between safety climate and safety outcomes in the 2nd company (n = 861). (A) Logistic regression with individual-level safety climate (level 1) as predictor
of  safe outcomes (level 1) and (B) Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) with Bernoulli estimation with work-unit-level safety climate (level 2) as predictor of safe outcomes
(level  1).
Constant (S.E.) Slope statistics
B (S.E.) Wald (df) Exp (B) with 95% CI
(A)
DV = near miss (yes or no)
OSC −.16 (.41) −.35 (.14)* 6.08 (1) .71 (.53–.93)
GSC  .18 (.35) −.43 (.11)** 15.24 (1) .65 (.53, .81)
DV  = recordable incident(s) (yes or no)
OSC −.69 (.59) −.58 (.21)** 7.48 (1) .56 (.37, .85)
GSC  −.87 (.49)† −.47 (.16)** 8.81 (1) .63 (.46, .85)
DV  = vehicle accident(s) (yes or no)
OSC −2.61 (.86)** −.19 (.30) .39 (1) .83 (.46, 1.49)
GSC  −3.58 (.79)** .13 (.24) .32 (1) 1.14 (.72, 1.82)
DV  = missed day(s) (yes or no)
OSC −1.76 (.70)* −.33 (.25) 1.77 (1) .72 (.45, 1.17)
GSC  −1.54 (.57)** −.37 (.18)* 3.98 (1) .69 (.48, .99)
00 (S.E.) 01 (S.E.) 01 95% CI
(B)
DV = near miss (yes or no)
ij = 00 + 01 × OSCj −1.31 (.04)** −.17 (.12) −.40, .07
ij = 00 + 01 × GSCj −1.35 (.04)** −.54 (.10)** −.74, −.35
DV  = recordable incident(s) (yes or no)
ij = 00 + 01 × OSCj −2.48 (.17)** −1.35 (.49)** −2.51, −.57
ij = 00 + 01 × GSCj −2.42 (.16)** −.76 (.36)* −1.45, −.06
DV  = vehicle accident(s) (yes or no)
ij = 00 + 01 × OSCj −3.26 (.05)** −.94 (.13)** −1.19, −.69
ij = 00 + 01 × GSCj −3.23 (.04)** −.57 (.10)** −.76, −.37
DV  = missed day(s) (yes or no)
ij = 00 + 01 × OSCj −2.63 (.17)** −.24 (.49) −1.22, .72
ij = 00 + 01 × GSCj −2.62 (.17)** −.14 (.38) −.88, .60
Note. OSC, organization-level safety climate (29 items); GSC, group-level safety climate (19 items); DV, dependent variable. Bernoulli estimation was used to handle the
binary  dependent variable, Probit (DVij = 1|ˇj) = ϕij , Log[(ϕij/(1 − ϕij)] = ij .
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ere performed (see Table 6A). When conducting multi-level anal-
ses, individual scores were level 1 variables, and shared unit scores
ere level 2 variables. The organization-level safety climate per-
eptions signiﬁcantly predicted utility workers’ involvement in
ear misses and incidents (B = −.35 (S.E. = .14, p < .05) and −.58
S.E. = .21, p < .01), respectively). The group-level safety climate
igniﬁcantly predicted involvement in near misses, recordable inci-
ents, and missed days (B = −.43 (S.E. = .11, p < .01), −.47 (S.E. = .16,
 < .01), and −.37 (S.E. = .18, p < .05)). These negative and statistically
igniﬁcant relationships between the individual (level 1 variable)
afety climate scores and subjective safety performance measures
level 1) conﬁrmed the predictive validity of the newly developed
tility industry-speciﬁc safety climate scale, although the indi-
idual safety climate scale scores could not signiﬁcantly predict
nvolvement in vehicle accidents.
For cross-level analysis, HLM with Bernoulli estimation was
dopted to investigate the relationship between the work-unit
afety climate (level 2) and safety outcomes (level 1). The
oefﬁcients estimation was based on the following equation:
ij = 00 + 01 × (Safety climate)j
Similar to the previous ordinary HLM models, safety climate
efers to either organization- or group-level safety climate while
 and j indicate individual and group, respectively. 01 is the slope
tatistic, which is the counterpart of B in OLS regression. ij is
og of (ϕij/(1 − ϕij), while ϕij denotes the probit of the dependent
ariable (i.e., probit [DVij = 1|ˇj]). Instead of the dependent vari-
bles of interests, ij was used as the surrogate outcome variable
n the equations in order to handle the range of restriction in val-
es of binary dependent variables. Level 2 organization-level safetyclimate could signiﬁcantly predict the utility workers’ involvement
in recordable incidents (01 = −1.35, S.E. = .49, 95% CI = −2.51, −.57,
p < .01) and vehicle accidents (01 = −.94, S.E. = .13, 95% CI = −1.19,
−.69, p < .01). Level 2 group-level safety climate was signiﬁcantly
linked with the utility employees’ involvement in near misses
(01 = −.54, S.E. = .10, 95% CI = −.74, −.35, p < .01), recordable inci-
dents (01 = −.76, S.E. = .36, 95% CI = −1.45, −.06, p < .05), and vehicle
accidents (01 = −.57, S.E. = .10, 95% CI = −.76, −.37, p < .01). With
the Bernoulli estimation based HLM analyses, work-unit safety
climate scores were unable to signiﬁcantly predict the employ-
ees’ missed days. Also, the work-unit organization-level safety
climate scale was  not signiﬁcantly associated with utility workers’
near misses. Nevertheless, all the other signiﬁcant and negative
relationships described above show that higher safety climate
scale scores are the precursor of lower probability of involve-
ment in poor safety performance outcomes. The ﬁndings are in
Table 6B.
In summary, criterion-related validity of the newly developed
utility industry-speciﬁc safety climate scale was supported at
both the individual-level (level 1 → level 1) and cross-level (level
2 → level 1) by the OLS, HLM, logistic regression, and HLM with
Bernoulli estimation analyses. The safety climate scores examined
in the current study could signiﬁcantly predict the utility employ-
ees’ safety behavior in a positive direction while predicting several
negative safety outcomes in a negative direction, as expected.4. Discussion
The objective of this study was  to develop and test the reliability
and validity of a new scale designed for measuring safety climate
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mong mobile remote workers, using utility electrical workers as
xemplar. The new scale employs perceived safety priority as the
etric of safety climate and a multi-level framework separating
he measurement of organization- and group-level safety climate
tems into two sub-scales. Results showed that six dimensions
or the organization-level safety climate and three dimensions for
he group-level safety climate could be drawn from EFAs; CFAs
onﬁrmed the safety climate scale’s construct validity. A series of
omogeneity tests demonstrated shared safety climate perceptions
mong work units. Criterion-related validity of the safety climate
cale in terms of the relationships between safety climate scores
nd self-reported safety behavior and work injuries was supported
y the analyses.
This study has several theoretical and practical implications.
irst, a safety climate measure suited for the utility/electric power
ndustry had not been introduced before the current study. The
evelopment of industry speciﬁc safety climate scales has been
uggested (see Zohar, 2010) as a way to identify the industries in
hich perceptions of safety climate are context-dependent. Know-
ng the best ways to measure and assess safety climate in speciﬁc
ndustries can lead to the formation of more concrete hypothe-
es related to how climates develop. Additionally, industry-speciﬁc
afety climate scales would also allow for more speciﬁc recommen-
ations and interventions, because the measures themselves are
ighly contextualized.
In the current study, a reliable and valid safety climate scale
as developed speciﬁcally for mobile remote workers (using util-
ty/electrical workers as exemplar). The target participants were
orkers who lack frequent face-to-face supervisory oversight.
afety climate can be very important for this unique population
ecause safety climate can act as a frame of reference that guides
ormative safety behavior, such that employees develop coherent
ets of perceptions and expectations regarding safety behavior-
utcome contingencies. Employees, thus, behave accordingly when
 strong safety climate exists, even in remote-working situations.
The ﬁnal survey included both types of items: (1) the generic
tems adapted from Zohar and Luria (2005) and validated by Huang
t al. (2013) that can be applied across industries and are relevant
o key safety issues of the remote worker, and (2) the industry
ontext-speciﬁc items developed and validated by the project team.
or the organizational-level safety climate items, six dimensions
Safety pro-activity, General training, Trucks and equipment,  Field
rientation, Financial Investment,  and Schedule ﬂexibility) with 29
tems were extracted from the EFA and conﬁrmed by the CFA.
esults from Table 1A show that the generic items all belong to
he dimension of Safety pro-activity. As consistent with the scien-
iﬁc literature, this indicates the importance of top management
f the company being pro-active about safety and committed to
afety. Our results also showed that the other ﬁve organizational-
evel safety climate dimensions were speciﬁc to the mobile remote
orker context. These dimensions and items suggested that it is
mportant that the companies provide relevant training as well
s good, well-maintained trucks and equipment for their employ-
es. The management needs to be oriented toward ﬁeld operations
nd also invest ﬁnancially in their employees’ safety. Since these
mployees work remotely, it is very important to provide ﬂexible
chedules for these workers.
For the group-level safety climate items, three important
imensions were Supervisory care, Participation encouragement, and
afety straight talk. These items (see Table 1B) showed that for
obile remote workers, it is important that front-line supervisors
are about their employees’ well-being and safety, provide appro-
riate feedback and effectively communicate with their workers,
nd continue encouraging employees to participate in safety. Also,
upervisors’ words and actions should be consistent. The results
f the study provide more actionable and speciﬁc suggestions fornd Prevention 59 (2013) 76– 86 85
future intervention (e.g., my  direct supervisor checks in with me
when I am in unsafe neighborhoods, uses explanations (not just
compliance) to get us to act safely, lets me rearrange my  work
schedule so it makes sense to me).
The ﬁndings from this study consistently showed that safety
climate, pertaining to organizational and managerial aspects, can
be a strong indicator of safe driving behavior and safety out-
comes in the utility/electric power industry. The industry-speciﬁc
scales incorporate various factors and items pertaining to the util-
ity industry which could be used by utility companies to indicate
where improvements can be made and, as such, may offer a valu-
able starting point for future safety interventions and actionable
plans.
Second, this study provided ample empirical evidence to sup-
port the theoretical suggestions from Zohar (2008, 2010). This study
highlighted two  different levels of perception regarding safety
climate in the utility/electric power industry, which led to the
development of the organization- and group-level safety climate
sub-scales. This is closely related to the process of safety climate for-
mation and transfer from organization level to individual employee
level via work group. In this regard, future studies about safety cli-
mate in the utility/electric power industry would beneﬁt from the
use of the newly developed level-speciﬁc safety climate scale.
Furthermore, this safety climate scale includes industry-speciﬁc
items regarding the perceptions of safety priority over competing
operational demands. The implementation of the safety climate
scale, which assesses multiple dimensions unique to organization
and group levels, would provide managers and employees with rich
feedback regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses in safety
policies and practice in their particular company.
Finally, the large sample size collected from two  large electric
companies strengthened the psychometric property and utility of
the newly developed safety climate scale. The sample size of over
2000 mobile remote workers from two  major companies enhanced
not only the uniqueness of the study population but also the sound
reliability and external validity of this scale.
There are several limitations to the current study. First, regard-
less of the fairly large sample size, only two companies participated
in the project. Caution should be used when generalizing the study
results to other utility/electric companies. Second, when recruiting
companies, those with poor safety records may  have been reluc-
tant to participate; therefore, there may  be selection bias. Third,
the survey itself was cross-sectional. A future longitudinal study
could provide stronger support for causal relationships between
safety climate and safety outcomes.
Furthermore, although evidence of reliability and validity of the
scale were supported in the study, caution should be applied, given
the nature of the outcome measures (i.e., same source, depend-
ent on respondents’ accurate recall of accidents/incidents over
a 12-month period). Due to practical constraints, no meaningful
objective safety performance data were available for the current
study. Future research would beneﬁt from utilizing other types of
outcomes (e.g., objective measures, supervisors’ ratings), as well as
data collected over a period of time (for example, 1 year after survey
administration) to provide additional evidence of criteria-related
validity. The second company, where we collected self-reported
injury information from employees, showed that 8.8% of partici-
pants reported “yes” to incident experience for the past 12 months.
Both the objective number of total incidents and the total number
of workers for the prior 12 months were also provided to us from
the same company. The total number of incidents divided by the
number of workers was 9.1%, which gives some evidence of the
validity of the self-reported injury data.
The developed safety climate scales also need to be utilized
with caution for practical and research purposes, especially when
their sub-scales are of great interest. A few sub-scales (e.g., the
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rganization-level sub-scale Schedule ﬂexibility and the group-level
ub-scale Safety straight talk) reported relatively small internal con-
istency and ICC(2) statistics. Although small numbers of items
n = 3) in these sub-scales could contribute to sub-optimal alpha
alues (Cortina, 1993), and theories and ICC(1) statistics were still
n support of aggregation of these sub-scales (LeBreton and Senter,
008; Murphy and Myors, 1998), conceptual robustness and legit-
macy of using these particular sub-scales as level 2 variables need
o be carefully considered.
In conclusion, a reliable and valid instrument to measure the
ssential elements of safety climate for utility/electrical workers in
he remote working situation has been introduced in the current
tudy. Results show that even though workers in the utility/electric
ower industry work remotely, they are able to perceive the safety
riorities of their companies, and these perceptions can be used to
redict safe working behavior and injury outcomes. The scale pro-
ides an in-depth understanding of safety climate based on its key
imensions and shows where improvements can be made at both
roup and organization levels. As such, it may  also offer a valuable
tarting point for future safety interventions.
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